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SCREENING EXPERT TESTIMONY AFTER
KUMHO TIRE CO. v. CARMICHAEL*
Miles J. Vigilante**
INTRODUCTION
Jurors hold the testimony of expert witnesses in high regard
when deliberating. In fact, studies have shown that expert testimo-
ny influences a juror's decision more often than not.' In response,
the proper administration of justice requires trial court judges to
ensure that all expert testimony they admit is not only relevant,
2
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
** Brooklyn Law School Class of 2001; M.A., Brooklyn College, 1996; B.A.,
State University of New York College at Oneonta, 1994.
' See Anthony Champagne, Expert Witnesses in the Courts: An Empirical
Examination, 76 JUDICATURE 5, 8 (1992) (revealing that 65% of jurors surveyed
stated that testimony of expert witnesses influenced the outcome of litigation);
Expert Witnesses Found Credible by Most Jurors, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 22, 1993,
at S4. A poll conducted by the National Law Journal and Lexis revealed that
60% of jurors who heard the testimony of expert witnesses found them to be
very believable; 29% found them to be somewhat believable; and 71% said that
the experts made a difference in the verdict of the jury. Id. See also Charles R.
Richey, Proposals to Eliminate the Prejudicial Effect of the Use of the Word
"Expert" Under the Federal Rules of Evidence in Civil and Criminal Jury Trials,
154 F.R.D. 537, 545 (1994) (providing that merely referring to a witness as an
"expert" affords the witness credibility).
2 FED. R. EviD. 401. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without it." Id. "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or
by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EvID. 402. When
considering the relevancy of expert testimony, it must be decided that the
testimony will assist the trier of fact. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 591-92 (1993). See also FED. R. EVID. 702 (stating that a witness
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but reliable.3 The trial judge must act as a "gatekeeper ' 4 by
excluding "expertise that is fausse and science that is junky."5
The first standard applied by the federal courts to ensure the
reliability of expert testimony, established in Frye v. United
States,6 required that expert testimony be based on "generally
accepted" scientific principles. Seventy years later, in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the United States Supreme
Court held that the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 702
(hereinafter "Rule 702") superseded the long established Frye
standard.' The Court held that "general acceptance," as required
under Frye, was not a necessary precondition to admissibility of
scientific expert testimony under Rule 702.8 The Court assigned
the trial court judge the duty to act as gatekeeper, preventing the
admission of unreliable expert testimony.9 In addition, the Court
qualified as an expert may testify if that testimony "will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue").
' See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (quoting
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590) (stating that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 "establishes
a standard of evidentiary reliability" for expert testimony). See also FED. R.
EvID. 702.
4 Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 597. The term "gatekeeper" is used to describe the
trial court judge's role in screening expert testimony for reliability. Id.
5 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 159 (Scalia, J., concurring). "[S]cience that is junky,"
commonly referred to as junk science, is defined as "flawed or distorted
scientific research." Stephanie E. Dutchess Trudeau, Motions in Limine and How
to Exclude Junk Science Testimony, A.B.A. CENTER FOR CONTINUING LEGAL ED.
NAT'L INST., Oct. 8-9, 1998.
6 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
7 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
8 "General acceptance," however, can still affect admissibility. Id. at 594. "A
'reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit
identification of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of
a particular degree of acceptance within that community'." Id. (quoting United
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)). "Rule 702 also applies
to 'technical, or other specialized knowledge,' but [the holding in Daubert] was
limited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the expertise that
was being offered in the particular case before court." Id. at 590 n.8.
' Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
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created a four factor test to determine the reliability of the testimony.'°
In the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, the obligation of district court judges to screen expert
testimony for reliability and trustworthiness, as established in
Daubert, was extended to apply to expert testimony in the areas of
"technical, or other specialized knowledge," as well as the
testimony of scientific experts.1' Moreover, Kumho gave trial
judges leeway as to how they may determine the reliability of
experts, permitting ad hoc determinations as to what factors are an
accurate measure of the reliability of an expert's testimony. 12
o Id. See infra notes 115-121 and accompanying text (discussing the four
factor reliability test applied by the Daubert Court).
" Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). See also FED.
R. EviD. 702 (stating that expert testimony may be based on scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge). This Note will often refer to expert testimony
based on "technical or other specialized knowledge" as nonscientific evidence.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the distinction between scientific
and nonscientific expert testimony with the following illustration:
If one wanted to explain to a jury how a bumblebee is able to fly, an
aeronautical engineer may be a helpful witness. Since flight principles
have some universality, the expert could apply general principles to the
case of the bumblebee. Conceivably, even if he has never seen a
bumblebee, he still would be qualified to testify, as long as he was
familiar with its component parts. On the other hand, if one wanted to
prove that bumblebees always take off into the wind, a beekeeper with
no scientific training at all would be an acceptable expert witness if a
proper foundation were laid for his conclusions. The foundation would
not relate to his formal training, but to his firsthand observations. In
other words, the beekeeper does not know any more about flight
principles than the jurors, but he has seen a lot more bumblebees than
they have.
Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349-50 (6th Cir. 1993).
In contrast, the Supreme Court has stated that "[tlhere is no clear line that
divides" scientific and nonscientific expert testimony. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 148.
"Disciplines such as engineering rest upon scientific knowledge. Pure scientific
theory itself may depend for its development upon observation and properly
engineered machinery. And conceptual efforts to distinguish the two are unlikely
to produce clear legal lines capable of application in particular cases." Id.
12 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 148.
545
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Thereby, trial judges may effectively exclude unfounded expert
testimony, ensuring the proper administration of justice."3
This Note will analyze the Kumho standard for determining the
admissibility of scientific and nonscientific expert testimony and
examine its evolution. This Note argues that the Kumho Court's
interpretation of Rule 702, and the standard set forth, strikes a
sound balance by granting district court judges discretionary
authority to exclude unreliable expert testimony, 4 while at the
same time adheres to the drafter's endorsement of the use of expert
testimony in litigation. 5 Furthermore, this Note will discuss the
problems associated with the use of expert testimony, including the
inability of jurors to discredit professional expert witnesses,' 6
which results in the need for trial court judges to act as "gatekeep-
ers."
17
Part I of this Note discusses the need for expert testimony in
jury trials and describes problems associated with its use. In
addition, Part I reviews the standards used to determine the
admissibility of expert testimony prior to Kumho. Part II analyzes
the Kumho decision, while Part III considers the Kumho Court's
'" See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing a trial court judge's ability to exclude
unfounded expert testimony).
4 See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147 (holding that the gatekeeping obligation of
trial judges applies to the testimony of all experts). See also Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 597 (assigning the trial court judge the duty to act as gatekeeper, preventing
the admission of unreliable expert testimony).
1" The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence stated that "[an intelligent
evaluation of the facts is often difficult or impossible without the application of
some scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. The most common
source of this knowledge is the expert witness." FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory
committee's note.
16 Professional expert witnesses earn a substantial portion of their income
from testifying at trials. Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 839 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th
Cir. 1988). A professional expert witness "spends substantially all of his time
consulting with attorneys and testifying." Id. See also Samuel R. Gross, Expert
Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1113, 1131 (1991) (stating that "[b]ecause experts
are paid to testify, and because they can be hired repeatedly to work on cases
with similar or identical issues, they can become expert witnesses").
" See supra note 1 (providing statistical data that demonstrates the inability




interpretation of Rule 702 and examines the beneficial effects this
interpretation will have on the use of expert testimony in future
federal proceedings. This Note concludes that Rule of 702, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Kumho, is an effective means
of ensuring the proper administration of justice by preventing
expert witnesses from influencing the outcome of cases with
unfounded testimony.
I. ADMISSIBILrrY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE: FROM EVOLUTION TO
THE KUMHO STANDARD
In light of the complex issues presented in modem litigation,
the testimony of expert witnesses is necessary in assisting jurors to
make intelligent, well reasoned determinations of the facts at
issue. 8 Due to the complexity of the testimony, however, jurors
generally are unable to determine if an expert witness's testimony
is reliable. 9 In addition, merely by referring to a witness as an
"expert" affords them credibility.2 ° Therefore, it is essential that
the judicial system create a standard by which a trial court judge
can assess the testimony of an expert and exclude that testimony
if it is deemed unreliable.
Over the last seventy-five years, the federal courts have
operated under a confusing evolution of admissibility standards
regarding expert testimony. The first standard determining the
admissibility of expert testimony required that the testimony be
based on "generally accepted" scientific principles in order to be
admissible.2" Under this standard, for expert testimony to be
admissible, the scientific principle or technique on which the
testimony was based had to be generally accepted in the particular
'8 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
'9 See WRIGHT & GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE
§ 6262, at 182 (1st ed. 1997) (providing that jurors cannot critically evaluate the
basis of an expert's testimony, resulting in the undermining of the jury's role of
trier of fact).
20 Richey, supra note 1, at 545.
21 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See also infra
Part I.B (discussing Frye, and the "general acceptance" standard).
547
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field to which it belonged.22 The "general acceptance" standard
stood alone in federal court for approximately fifty years until the
Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975.23 The implemen-
tation of the Federal Rules of Evidence created some confusion as
to whether Rule 702, which regulated the admissibility of expert
testimony in federal proceedings, was merely the codification of the
long standing "general acceptance" standard or established a new
standard that no longer required general acceptance. 24 In 1993, the
Supreme Court held, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
that Rule 702 superseded the "general acceptance" standard and the
latter was no longer a necessary precondition of admissibility of
scientific evidence.2 5 Daubert created a four factor test to be
applied by district court judges to determine the admissibility of
scientific expert testimony.2 6 This four factor test focused on: (1)
whether the expert's methodology was susceptible to testing or
falsification; (2) whether the theory had been subjected to peer
review; (3) its potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory
had gained acceptance. 27 Daubert, however, left the circuit courts
confused as to whether the standard that it created governed
nonscientific expert testimony, or whether the four factors applied
by the Court in its admissibility assessment were an exclusive list
of determining factors.28
In 1999, ending the confusion, the Supreme Court held, in
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, that the trial judge's gatekeeping
role, as established in Daubert, applies to the testimony of all
22 Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
23 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye
v. United States, a Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1229 (1980)
(stating that federal courts generally applied the Frye standard before the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
24 FED. R. EVID. 702. See infra Part I.C (discussing the confusion among the
circuits as to whether Rule 702 superseded Frye).
25 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993).
26 Id. See infra Part I.D (discussing the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of Rule 702, in Daubert).
27 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
28 See infra Part I.E (discussing the confusion among the circuits as to
whether the Daubert standard applies to nonscientific expert testimony).
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experts.29 Moreover, the Court held that the Daubert four factor
test does not constitute a definitive checklist or rigid test.3
0
Rather, a district court judge need only consider the specific factors
identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the
reliability of expert testimony.3' As a result, the district court
judge was granted great discretion in determining the reliability and
thus admissibility of an expert's testimony.
A. Expert Witnesses: An Overview
Most witnesses who offer testimony at trial are lay witness-
es.32 Lay witnesses are called to testify because they have seen,
heard, or done something relevant to the issues in a particular case.
Testimony is generally limited to what a witness has observed or
experienced directly and the reasonable conclusions that can be
drawn from those observations and experiences.33 Experts,
9 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). Daubert held
that "general acceptance" was no longer a requirement for the admissibility of
scientific expert testimony. 509 U.S. at 588. The Court stated that Rule 702 also
applies to "technical, or other specialized knowledge," but its discussion in
Daubert was limited to the scientific context because that was the nature of the
expertise that was being offered in the particular case before court. Id. at 590
n.8. Kumho held that the trial judge's gatekeeping role applies to all expert
testimony that is permitted under Rule 702. 526 U.S. at 147.
30 Kumho, U.S. 526 at 150. The Court stated that it "can neither rule out, nor
rule in, for all cases and for all time the applicability of the factors mentioned
in Daubert .... Too much depends upon the particular circumstances of the
particular case at issue." Id.
"1 Id. at 151. The Court concluded that the trial judge must have wide
discretion in deciding in a particular case how to determine whether an expert's
testimony is reliable. Id. at 151-52. Therefore, a trial court judge need only
consider those specific factors used in Daubert where the judge believes them
to be "reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony." Id. at 152-53.
32 A lay witness is defined as "[a] witness who does not testify as an expert
and who therefore may only give an opinion or make an inference that is based
on firsthand knowledge and helpful in understanding the testimony or in
determining facts." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1597 (7th ed. 1999).
31 "The requirement that witnesses have personal knowledge ... [is] a very
old rule, having its roots in medieval law, which demanded that they speak only
'what they see and hear'." EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 11 (1987). This common law rule evolved throughout history, resulting in the
549
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however, constitute an entirely different category of witness. 4 An
expert is not limited to personal knowledge and may base testimo-
ny on information gathered for the sole purpose of offering that
testimony.35 "[A]n expert witness may offer an opinion on the
cause or consequences of occurrences, interpret the actions of other
persons, draw conclusions on the basis of circumstances, comment
on the likelihood of events, and may even state her beliefs
regarding such seemingly nonfactual issues as fault, damage,
negligence, [and] avoidability. ' 36
Expert testimony can be a valuable tool to a litigant when
facing the complex issues of modem litigation. Complex litigation
includes any cases involving "transactions or occurrences, or
requiring resort to forms of evidence, beyond the experience of the
typical lay jury. Included are cases involving corporate transactions,
mergers and acquisitions, securities, sophisticated product liability
issues, antitrust, intellectual property, and the like. ' '37 It is difficult
for a jury to evaluate the facts of such complex cases intelligently
without applying some scientific, technical or specialized knowl-
edge.38 Many jurors do not, however, posses the knowledge that
is required to make reasoned determinations of facts in a complex
codification of Federal Rule of Evidence 701. Id. Rule 701 provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness" testimony in
the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or
inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the
witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness"
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
FED. R. EVID. 701. See also Thomas E. Baker, The Impropriety of Expert
Testimony on the Law, 40 U. KAN. L. REv. 325, 326 (1992) (stating that "[t]he
requirement that a witness testify only about personal or firsthand knowledge, not
mere personal opinion, has its roots in medieval law").
'4 See FED. R. EVID. 702-06 (detailing the federal rules pertaining to
evidence provided by experts).
" STEVEN LUBET, EXPERT TESTIMONY, A GUIDE FOR EXPERT WITNESSES
AND THE LAWYERS WHO ExAMiNE THEM 2 (1998).
36 Id. See also FED. R. EVID. 702 (providing that an expert witness "may
testify ... in the form of an opinion or otherwise").
17 Ronald S. Longhofer, Jury Trial Techniques in Complex Civil Litigation,
32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 335, 336 (1999).
38 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
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litigation. 39 Furthermore, those educated or experienced in the
subject matter of a case may be considered by the lawyers as
biased. "Knowledgeable potential jurors thus are more likely to be
dismissed from the jury than those people who posses no special
awareness about the case or the subject matter."4 One commenta-
tor has stated that, "given the typical jury selection process, the
jury is the only decision making body in the world selected
specifically for its lack of expertise in the subject matter."41 The
expert's function is to explain complex subjects in a manner that
makes them understandable to the average person, providing jurors
with the knowledge that is necessary for them to make a reasoned
determination. 42 Thus, experts play an indispensable role in our
judicial system.
There has been a sharp increase in the use of expert testimony
in litigation.43 Demand for expert witnesses has increased greatly
as the number of civil lawsuits and the role of complex information
31 See Steven I. Friedland, Legal Institutions: The Competency and
Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 190, 190 (1990)
(stating that "[n]umerous examples support the contention that a jury selected at
random sometimes serves as an incompetent decision maker"); Franklin Strier,
The Educated Jury: A Proposal for Complex Litigation, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 49,
54 (1997) (providing that "jury trials involving complex or highly technical facts
or legal issues can present a fundamental problem of decision-maker compe-
tence") [hereinafter The Educated Jury].
40 See Friedland, supra note 39, at 194.
41 See Longhofer, supra note 37, at 337.
42 Mike Fimea, Expert Witnesses Increasingly Used in Legal Process; Valley
Office Taps Lucrative Vein, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Apr. 7, 1998 at EV4. See also
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (describing the role of an expert
witness as someone who will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue"); Carol Henderson Garcia, Expert Witness
Malpractice: A Solution to the Problem of the Negligent Expert Witness, 12
MIss. C. L. REv. 39, 58 (1991) (providing that "the high degree of informational
and technological specialization in our society makez the use of expert witnesses
imperative").
41 See Expert Witnesses: Booming Business for the Specialists, N.Y. TIMES,
July 5, 1987, at 1(stating that the demand for expert witness has multiplied ). See
also Gross, supra note 16 (offering empirical data which revealed that experts
testified in 86% of civil jury trials).
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in such suits has risen.44 The increase, however, is due primarily
to the impact that experts are having on the outcomes of cases.45
A poll regarding the use of experts demonstrated that their
testimony significantly affects case decisions46 and that their use
can be worth the added costs. 47 A large majority of jurors agreed
that the experts whose testimony they heard were both credible and
influential in the outcome of the cases.48 The results of the poll
revealed that sixty percent of jurors who heard the testimony of
expert witnesses found them to be very believable; twenty-nine
percent found them to be somewhat believable; and seventy-one
percent said that the experts made a difference in determining their
verdict.49 Furthermore, the increase in the use of expert testimony
in litigation is due to the broadening of the definition of the term
"expert" in the Federal Rules of Evidence.50 Experts are not
merely limited to the "scientific" and "technical" fields of knowl-
edge, but now extend to include all witnesses with "specialized
knowledge."51 Specialized is a more general term than "scientific"
and "technical. 52 Specialized knowledge has been interpreted as
44 Expert Witnesses: Booming Business for the Specialists, supra note 43, at
1. See also Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. Rich. L. Rev.
473, 473 (1986) (stating that "[tihe law's use of expert witnesses has expanded
at a pace reflective of society's reliance on specialized knowledge").
41 See supra note 1 (discussing polls that reveal jurors inability to discredit
expert witnesses).
46 See Expert Witnesses Found Credible by Most Jurors, supra note 1, at S4.
"The clearest advice trial lawyers can glean from this poll is simple: If you have
the resources, hire an expert." See Expert Witnesses Found Credible by Most
Jurors, supra note 1, at S4.
47 See also The Use and Misuse of Expert Evidence in the Courts, 77
JUDICATURE 68, 70 (1993) (revealing that a plaintiff spent five million dollars to
"prepare" one expert).
48 Expert Witnesses Found Credible by Most Jurors, supra note 1, at S4.
49 Expert Witnesses Found Credible by Most Jurors, supra note 1, at S4.
'0 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
51 Id.
52 Linda Sandstrom Simard & William G. Young, Daubert's Gatekeeper:
The Role of the District Judge in Admitting Expert Testimony, 68 TuL. L. REv.
1457, 1467 (1994). Specialized knowledge:
might include such diverse topics as a government agent's testimony
regarding the cause of an explosion, a witness" knowledge of a foreign
552
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a "catch-all" phrase that extends beyond knowledge that is thought
to be "scientific" or "technical. 53 "Specialized knowledge refers
to any knowledge focused on a particular area of study, profession,
or experience.
5 4
The broadening of the definition of experts, coupled with a
greater demand for their services, has resulted in a substantial
increase in the number of individuals claiming to possess expert
knowledge.55 In addition, the number of fields in which this
growing number of experts claim their expertise has expanded
greatly.56 Several expert witness professional organizations
57
provide attorneys with a "one-stop source for expert witnesses from
a multitude of disciplines and fields. 58 Furthermore, attorneys are
now unable to read through legal publications without being
bombarded by advertisements for experts witnesses.5 9 If necessary,
culture, a lawyer's experience in real estate closings, an interpreter's
proficiency in Spanish, or a federal agent's knowledge of and
experience with the communication methods of narcotics dealers.
Id.
" Id. at 1468.
* FED. R. EviD. 702 advisory committee's note. "[W]ithin the scope of the
rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g. physicians,
physicists, and architects, but also the large group sometimes called 'skilled'
witnesses, such as bankers or landowners testifying to land values." Id.
" Expert Witnesses Booming Business for the Specialists, supra note 43, at
1. "Individuals with knowledge in scores of obscure fields.., have joined tens
of thousands of doctors, university professors and engineers in the expert witness
industry." Expert Witnesses Booming Business for the Specialists, supra note 43,
at 1.
56 One Internet site contains links to experts in over 250 fields of expertise.
The Internet Directory of Expert Witnesses (visited Mar. 11, 2000) <http://www.-
expertwitness.com/ca/alpha4.htn>.
" A few of these expert witness professional organizations are: The National
Registry of Experts, Providing Professional Visibility for Experts Through the
World Wide Web (visited Mar. 11, 2000) <http://www.expert-registry.com/expert-
registry.html>; The Internet Directory of Expert Witnesses (visited Mar. 11,
2000) <http://www.expertwitness.comca/alpha4.htm>; ExpertLaw.com (visited
Mar. 11, 2000) <http://www.expertlaw.com>.
58 See The National Registry of Experts, supra note 57.
'9 See generally Classifieds, A.B.A. J., April 2000 at 116-19 (containing
advertisements for expert witnesses in areas ranging from accidents to videotape
analysis).
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and for the right price, one can easily obtain the testimony of
experts in any field from amusement parks6° to wood sciences.61
With the increased use of experts in courtrooms and the trend
recognizing expert witnesses as a profession, the quality of
testimony is becoming a growing concern.62 This concern stems
from the view that experts are determining the outcome of the
cases in which they testify "by usurping the fact-finding role of the
... jury., 63 It is believed that when jurors are confronted with
complex issues, they are willing to defer to the guidance of a
testifying expert.64 Judge Learned Hand, in 1901, in recognition
of this problem stated that "the expert has taken the jury's place if
they believe him., 65 More recently, this problem has been ad-
dressed by the courts.66 In United States v. Scheffer, the Supreme
60 Safety Play, Inc. (last modified Feb. 21, 2000) <http://www.mindspring.-
com/-safetyplay/> (providing expert testimony in the field of recreation
playground and sports safety).
61 Josephson-Werdowatz & Associates, Inc. (visited Oct. 25, 1999)
<http://www.expertwitness.com/jwa/> (performing design and construction defect
investigations, as well as evaluations of wood, masonry, steel, and concrete
structures).
62 See Elizabeth Davidson, Expert Witnesses: The Newest Profession: Is the
Job of the Expert Witness Becoming a Profession in its Own Right?, LAWYER,
May 17, 1999 at 28 (discussing the acceleration of the trend towards creating a
recognized profession of expert witnesses).
63 The Use and Misuse of Expert Evidence in the Courts, supra note 47. It
is argued that by usurping the fact-finding role of the judge and jury, expert
witnesses undermine the adversary system. The Use and Misuse of Expert
Evidence in the Courts, supra note 47.
64 The Use and Misuse of Expert Evidence in the Courts, supra note 47. See
also WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 19, § 6262, at 182 (providing that jurors
cannot critically evaluate the basis of an expert's testimony, resulting in the
undermining of the jury's role of trier of fact).
65 Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 52 (1901). Many feel jurors are unable to
discredit the testimony of experts, and as a result, the expert is the one who is
actually deciding the case. See supra note 1 (discussing studies that reveal
jurors" inability to discredit expert witnesses).
6 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 n.7 (1985) (providing that
"[tiestimony emanating from the depth and scope of specialized knowledge is
very impressive to a jury. The same testimony from another source can have less
effect" (quoting F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLAIr, INVESTIGATION AND PREPARATION
554
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Court recognized that juries give excess weight to the opinions of
experts.67 The Court stated that an expert's "aura of infallibility
... can lead jurors to abandon their duty to assess credibility."6
Furthermore, it has been suggested that merely using the term
"expert" when referring to an expert witness in the courtroom
causes jurors to give more weight to an expert's testimony than it
may deserve. 69 Because of the everyday meaning and use of the
term,o7 upon hearing the word "expert" used in the courtroom, a
juror will give an expert witness greater attention and credibility
than any other witness or evidence. 7' An additional problem
presented by the use of expert testimony in litigation is created
when opposing sides present conflicting expert testimony. "Jurors
bec[o]me stupefied by the sharply competing testimonies of
opposing experts. '"72 As a result of these "battles of the experts,"
the testimony that was supposed to assist the jury in making an
intelligent evaluation of the facts has, in fact, become combative
and perplexing.73
Amplifying the problems presented by the use of expert
testimony is the fact that experts are no longer impartial witnesses
used by attorneys to explain difficult concepts to the jury. Rather,
they have become advocates for the party that hired them, often
reaching conclusions based on their fees and not upon their expert
OF CUMINAL CASES §175 (1970)).
67 523 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1998) (holding that a per se rule excluding the
evidence of a polygraph expert is constitutional). See also Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (stating that expert testimony is
powerful because of the difficulty the jury faces in evaluating it); United States
v. Amarel, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (asserting that expert testimony
has a great potential to influence a jury "because of its aura of special reliability
and trustworthiness").
61 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 314.
69 Richey, supra note 1, at 543.
70 Expert is defined as "[a] person with the status of an authority (in a
subject) by reason of special skill, training, or knowledge; a specialist." NEW
SHORTER OXFORD, ENGLISH DICTIONARY 887 (4th ed. 1994).
71 Richey, supra note 1, at 543.
72 Franklin Strier, Road to Reform: Judges on Juries and Attorneys, 30 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1249, 1271 (1997) [hereinafter Road to Reform].
73 Id.
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knowledge.74 Such self-serving expert testimony, and the impact
that it has on the outcome of jury deliberations, has made it
necessary for the judicial system to create a standard by which the
testimony may be excluded.
B. Excluding Expert Testimony: The Creation of a Standard
The need to exclude unreliable expert testimony predated the
recent explosion of experts and their use in litigation. The federal
courts first dealt with the issue of the reliability of expert testimony
in 1923."5 In Frye v. United States, the Federal Circuit Court for
the District of Columbia refused to admit expert testimony that was
not based on "generally accepted" scientific principles.76 The
Court stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the
line between the experimental and the demonstrable stages
is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.77
74 The Use and Misuse of Expert Evidence in the Courts, supra note 47, at
69. "The hiring and preparation of experts.., has led to charges that an expert
really is a 'hired gun,' telling only that portion of the truth that helps the side of
the attorney who is paying the witness." Id. See also Hand, supra note 65, at 53
(providing that an expert witness "becomes the hired champion of one side");
Strier, Road to Reform, supra note 72, at 1272 (stating that "[c]ompensation
begets allegiance").
7 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
76 Id. at 1014. The Frye Court refused to admit into evidence expert
testimony that was deduced from performing a systolic blood pressure deception
test, based upon a theory that an individual's blood pressure rises when that
individual is telling a lie. Id. Because the systolic blood pressure test had not yet
gained general acceptance, the court held that it would not be admitted. Id.
77 Id. at 1014.
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Under the Frye standard, for expert testimony to have been
admissible, the scientific principle or technique on which the
testimony was based had to have been generally accepted in the
particular field to which it belonged.78 It was not sufficient that
an expert, or even several experts, testified that a particular
technique was valid. Frye imposed a greater burden by requiring
that the technique be "generally accepted" by the relevant scientific
community.79 Such a test led critics to charge that the Frye stan-
dard was too exclusive, resulting in the inadmissibility of reliable
expert testimony.8° Thus, it was argued that, "[a] literal reading
of Frye v. United States would require that the courts always await
the passing of a 'cultural lag' during which period the new method
will have had sufficient time to diffuse through scientific discipline
and create a requisite body of scientific opinion needed for accept-
ability. ' 81
Despite the criticism of the Frye test, the federal courts applied
the common law "general acceptance," Frye standard of admitting
expert testimony for half a century. It was not until the 1970s, after
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, that Frye lost its
place as the only admissibility test used in federal proceedings.82
Under the current standard applied by federal courts, "general
78 Id.
79 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIIC EVIDENCE
§1-5, at 10 (1st ed. 1986) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE].
8o Giannelli, supra note 23, at 1229.
81 Id. (quoting Maketskos & Spielman, Introduction of New Scientific
Methods in Court, in LAW ENFORCEMENT SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, 957, 958
(S.A. Yefsky ed. 1967)).
82 After the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, courts
began to apply a standard that did not require "general acceptance." See United
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985) (admitting expert
testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness identifications based upon an
inquiry that did not require general acceptance); Unites States v. Williams, 583
F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that whether expert evidence in the
form of spectrographic voice analysis was admissible cannot rest solely on
general acceptance); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975)
(providing that "[a]bsolute certainty of result or unanimity of scientific opinion
is not required for admissibility" of expert evidence in the form of spectrographic
voice analysis).
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acceptance" is no longer required for expert testimony to be found
admissible.13 Frye's standard, however, has been retained by some
state courts. 4
C. Enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Conflict
with Frye
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was enacted in 1975
to regulate the admissibility of expert testimony in federal court
proceedings.85 It provides "[i]f scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 86 Interest-
ingly, the new rule did not address the standard of admissibility
under the Frye test, followed by the courts.87
While conditioning its admissibility, the drafters of the Federal
Rules of Evidence encouraged the use of expert testimony.88 It
83 The Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
held that Frye's "general acceptance" standard had been superseded by Rule 702.
509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993). "General acceptance" can, however, still affect
admissibility. Id. at 594. "A 'reliability assessment does not require, although it
does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an
express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that communi-
ty'." Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir.
1985)).
84 Paul Giannelli & Edward Imwinkelied, Scientific Evidence: The Fallout
from Supreme Court's Decision in Kumho Tire, 14 CRIM. JUST. 12, 15 (2000).
Because Daubert rests on the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence-a
federal statute, rather than on the United States Constitution, it is not binding on
the states. Id. Therefore, states are free to apply the Frye standard. Id. As a
result, some state courts have retained the Frye standard. Id. "Frye still has its
adherents in some of the most populous states: California, New York, Pennsylva-
nia, Michigan, and Florida." Id.
85 FED. R. EVID. 702.
86 id.
87 Giannelli, supra note 23, at 1229.
88 See FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note. See also WRIGHT &
GOLD, supra note 19, § 6262, at 184 (discussing the liberal approach of the
Federal Rules of Evidence towards the admissibility of expert testimony)
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was the drafters" view that "[a]n intelligent evaluation of the facts
is often difficult or impossible without the application of some
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. The most
common source of this knowledge is the expert witness. 89
Moreover, the drafters intended the term expert to encompass far
more than those individuals claiming specialized knowledge in an
area of science. It was stated in the advisory committee's notes
following Rule 702 that:
The rule is broadly phrased. The fields of knowledge
which may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the
'scientific' and 'technical' but extend to all 'specialized'
knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a narrow
sense, but as a person qualified by 'knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education.' Thus within the scope
of the rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the
word, e.g., physicians, physicists, and architects, but also
the large group sometimes called 'skilled' witnesses, such
as bankers or landowners testifying to land values.9°
With the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
standard of admissibility of expert testimony became unclear.
Courts were divided over whether Frye had been superseded by
Rule 702.91 Frye's "general acceptance" standard was the leading
(footnote omitted).
89 FED. R. EviD. 702 advisory committee's note.
9 Id.
91 Some federal courts rejected the Frye standard after the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794 (2d
Cir. 1992) (providing that "the second circuit was one of the first jurisdictions
to abandon the Frye methodology in favor of a more liberal approach"); United
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985) (admitting expert
testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness identifications based upon an
inquiry that did not require general acceptance); United States v. Williams, 583
F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating that whether expert evidence in the form
of spectrographic voice analysis was admissible cannot rest solely on general
acceptance); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975)
(providing that "[albsolute certainty of result or unanimity of scientific opinion
is not required for admissibility" of expert evidence in the form of spectrographic
voice analysis); Smith v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1561, 1571 (N.D.
Ga. 1991) (stating that "federal evidence law does not require that the Frye test
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standard applied in federal courts at the time the Federal Rules of
Evidence were considered and adopted. Therefore, it would be
expected that the drafters of rules would have made "some
pronouncement about the continuing vitality of the standard."92
However, "[t]he issue [was] simply ignored in the Advisory
Committee's Notes, congressional committee reports, floor debates,
and hearings. 93
It has been argued that, because Frye's general acceptance
standard was the established rule, and, as nothing contained in the
Federal Rules of Evidence appears to repudiate that standard, it
remains intact.94 One commentator noted that, "[ilt would be odd
if the Advisory Committee and the Congress intended to overrule
the vast majority of cases excluding [scientific evidence not based
on generally accepted principles] without explicitly stating so." 95
As a result of Rule 702's silence in regard to a standard of
admissibility, courts continued generally to apply Frye's "general
acceptance" standard.
96
be met prior to the admission of novel scientific evidence").
While other federal courts continued to apply Frye subsequent to the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See United States v. Shorter, 809
F.2d 54, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (declaring "Frye is still the law in this Circuit");
United States v. Carmel, 801 F.2d 997, 999 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that the Frye
standard has been reaffirmed subsequent to the passage of the Federal Rules of
Evidence); United States v. Llewellyn, 723 F.2d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1983)
(holding that "evidence pertaining to a defense of insanity by reason of
pathological gambling" shall not be admitted for its failure to meet general
acceptance under Frye); United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359, 363 (6th Cir.
1979) (providing that "general acceptance of microscopic hair analysis in the
scientific community" is required in order to admit expert testimony based on
that procedure); Hughes v. Matthews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 1978)
(holding that "psychiatric diagnosis satisfies the general test for admissibility of
scientific evidence since it is 'sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs"') (quoting Frye, 293 F. at
1014).
9 Downing, 753 F.2d at 1234.
9 Giannelli, supra note 23, at 1229 (footnotes omitted).
94 Giannelli, supra note 23, at 1229.
9' Downing, 753 F.2d 1234 (quoting S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL at 452 (3d ed. 1982)).
96 See Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F. 2d 1106, 1115-16 (5th
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In contrast, some courts took the view that Rule 702 created a
standard that no longer required expert testimony to be based on a
generally accepted methodology.97 Proponents of this view
focused on the language of the Federal Rules of Evidence.98
"Because scientific evidence could be shown to be reliable and thus
relevant under the [Federal Rules of Evidence] without regard to its
general acceptance in the scientific community... the standard of
admissibility [created] is inconsistent with the Frye test.' 99
Cir. 1991) (holding medical expert's testimony inadmissible because the expert's
methodology was not generally accepted within the relevant scientific communi-
ty); United States v. Smith, 776 F. 2d 892, 898 (10th Cir. 1985) (providing that
"blood alcohol content has general acceptance in the scientific community and
thus meets the classic test for admissibility of scientific evidence that was given
in Frye"); Unites States v. Traficant, 566 F. Supp. 1046, 1047 (N.D. Ohio 1983)
(holding expert testimony regarding psychological stress evaluators inadmissible
under the Frye standard).
97 See Downing, 753 at 1238 (admitting expert testimony concerning the
reliability of eyewitness identifications based on an inquiry not requiring general
acceptance); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d. Cir. 1978)
(holding that an admissibility analysis of expert evidence cannot rest solely on
general acceptance); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975)
(providing that "[aibsolute certainty of result or unanimity of scientific opinion
is not required for admissibility" of expert evidence in the form of spectrographic
voice analysis).
98 GIANNELLI & IMWiNKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 79, § 1-
5(F), at 29.
99 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 79, § 1-
5(F), at 29-30.
Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as 'evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.' Rule 402 provides that '[a]ll relevant
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitu-
tion of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority.' Because scientific evidence could be shown to be reliable
and thus relevant under Rule 401 without regard to its general
acceptance in the scientific community and because none of the
exceptions enumerated in Rule 402 applies, the Federal Rules provide
a standard of admissibility that is inconsistent with the Frye test.
GIANNELLI & IMWiNKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 79, §1-5(F), at
29-30.
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Courts began to apply a reliability standard that did not
exclusively focus on whether an expert's testimony was generally
accepted. The Second Circuit, in United States v. Williams, stated
that "[a] determination of reliability cannot rest solely on a process
of 'counting (scientific) noses'. ' ° According to the Williams
court, when determining the admissibility of scientific testimony,
"[t]he sole question is whether the [expert's methodology] has
reached a level of reliability sufficient to warrant its use in the
courtroom."'0 ' In its assessment of the evidentiary reliability of
expert testimony the court looked to several indicators other than
general acceptance. °2 Similarly, in United States v. Downing, the
Third Circuit held that the reliability assessment under Rule 702
does not require "general acceptance."'0 3 The court stated that
Rule 702 calls for:
[A] reliability inquiry that we envision is flexible and may
turn on a number of considerations, in contrast to the
process of scientific 'nose-counting' that would appear to
be compelled by a careful reading of Frye. Unlike the Frye
standard, the reliability assessment does not require,
although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant
scientific community and an express determination of a
particular degree of acceptance within that community. 04
The controversy as to the applicable standard of admissibility
of expert testimony under Rule 702 in relation to the Frye test
continued for nearly two decades. Finally responding, the United
States Supreme Court sought to resolve the dispute as to whether
100 583 F.2d at 1198.
101 Id.
'02 Id. at 1198-99. The Williams court suggested five factors that could affect
a trial judge's determination of reliability. These factors were: the potential rate
of error; the existence and maintenance of standards; the care and concern with
which a scientific technique has been employed, and whether it appears to lend
itself to abuse; the existence of an analogous relationship with other forms of
techniques that are admitted into evidence; and the presence of "fail-safe"
characteristics or the likelihood that potential inaccuracies will advantage the
defendant. Id.




Frye's general acceptance standard had been displaced by the
enactment of the Federal Rules.
D. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. °5 and
Rule 702
In 1993, the Supreme Court addressed the conflict over the
proper standard of admission of expert testimony in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. °6 In Daubert, the Court held
that the enactment of Rule 702 superseded the long established
Frye standard. 10 7 The Court held that "general acceptance," as
required under Frye, was not a necessary precondition to admissi-
bility of expert testimony under Rule 702.108 The Court stated
that, "Frye made 'general acceptance' the exclusive test for
admitting scientific expert testimony. That austere standard, absent
from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should
not be applied in federal trials.""° The Court noted that the
drafting history of Rule 702 failed to address or acknowledge Frye
and its "rigid 'general acceptance' requirement," and how that
requirement was "at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal
Rules of Evidence."' 10
'o' 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
106 id.
" Id. at 587.
'08 Id. at 588. However, "general acceptance" can still affect admissibility.
Id. at 594. "A 'reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit,
explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an express
determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that community'." Id.
(quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)).
'0o Id. at 589. The Court discussed the use of background common law, such
as Frye, in interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 587-88; See also
United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51-52 (1984) (using the common law to
interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence); Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes
on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 908, 915 (1978) (stating that
"[i]n principle under the Federal Rules no common law of evidence remains ....
[i]n reality, of course, the body of common law knowledge continues to exist,
though in the somewhat altered form of a source of guidance in the exercise of
delegated powers").
"0 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
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The Court, in finding that the Federal Rules of Evidence
displaced the Frye test, created a standard that required the trial
court judge to ensure that all expert testimony be both relevant and
reliable. " ' Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority stated that,
"in short, [Rule 702] establishes a standard of evidentiary reliabili-
ty." 2 Under the Daubert standard, scientific expert testimony
may be found to be reliable and thus admissible, regardless of
whether it is based on a methodology that has not gained general
acceptance.13 Rule 702 does not establish "general acceptance"
as a prerequisite to admissibility of expert testimony.11 4
The Daubert Court adopted four non-exclusive factors to be
examined by the trial court judge in determining the reliability of
expert testimony."5 The first factor asks whether the technique
used by the expert could be, or has been, tested to see if it can be
falsified. 116 The second factor reviews whether the technique used
by the expert was subjected to peer review and publication. 7
Publication of a theory or technique subjects it to the scrutiny of
others in the field of the expert and increases the likelihood that
flaws in the methodology will be detected.' The third factor
considers the known or potential rate of error of the technique." 9
Finally, the fourth factor involves the "general acceptance" of the
technique within the expert's professional field."1° General
11 Id. at 589.
12 Id. at 590.
"id. at 588.
114 Id.
... Id. at 593-94. The four factors that were discussed by the Court were not
intended to be a definitive checklist for admissibility under the newly created
standard. Id. This was clarified by the Kumho Court, which held that the trial
court should consider the specific Daubert factors only where they are reasonable
measures of reliability. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152
(1999).
116 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
117 Id. at 593-94.
118 Id.
"9 Id. at 594.
120 Id.
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acceptance, the sole factor of the Frye standard, was incorporated
in the four factor Daubert test.
12
'
After Daubert's new standard, general acceptance of an expert's
technique can "have a bearing on the inquiry," but is not a
requirement for admissibility. 22 The four Daubert factors charge
the trial court judge with the duty to act as a gatekeeper to prevent
the admission of unreliable expert testimony.123 Thus, Daubert
resolved the conflict as to whether the Frye standard existed under
the Federal Rules of Evidence. This long sought resolution was
tempered, however, as Daubert quickly gave rise to a new conflict
regarding expert testimony within the federal court system. 24
E. The Confusion Caused by Daubert
Daubert held that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded
Frye and created a standard of admissibility for scientific expert
testimony that did not require a showing of general acceptance.125
When addressing the appropriate standard of admissibility to be
applied to scientific expert testimony, however, the Daubert Court
provided that "Rule 702 also applies to technical, or other special-
ized knowledge[, but o]ur current discussion is limited to the
scientific context because that is the nature of the expertise offered
here."1 26 By limiting its Daubert opinion to only scientific mat-
ters, "'27 the Court left federal judges unequipped to determine
whether the Daubert standard was applicable to the admissibility
of nonscientific expert testimony. Confusion ensued as a result,
leading to a lack of uniformity in application by the federal
circuits. "'
121 id.
'22 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
123 Id. at 597.
124 See infra Part I.E (discussing the confusion among the circuits as to
whether the Daubert standard applies to nonscientific expert testimony).
125 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 590 n.8.
128 Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed this confusion in his concurring
opinion, by asking the question: "Does all of this dicta apply to an expert seeking
to testify on the basis of 'technical or other specialized knowledge'-the other
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Some courts limited the application of Daubert strictly to
scientific experts.129 In Compton v. Subaru of America, the Tenth
Circuit held that the Daubert factors were applicable only when
assessing the admissibility of scientific expert testimony. 3 ° The
Compton court stated that:
Application of the Daubert factors is unwarranted in cases
where expert testimony is based solely on experience or
training. In such cases, Rule 702 merely requires the trial
court to make a preliminary finding that the proffered
expert testimony is both relevant and reliable. . . . [W]e do
not believe Daubert completely changes our traditional
analysis under Rule 702. Instead, Daubert sets out addi-
tional factors the trial court should consider under Rule
702 if an expert witness offers testimony based upon a
particular methodology or technique.'
Because the expert testimony being offered was nonscientific
testimony, not "based upon a particular methodology or technique,"
the court applied a "traditional Rule 702 analysis." 132
Similarly, in Desrosiers v. Flight Int'l of Florida Inc.,133 and
McKendall v. Crown Control Corp.,'3 the Ninth Circuit held that
types of expert knowledge to which Rule 702 applies--or are the 'general
observations' limited only to 'scientific knowledge'?" Id. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring).
129 Some courts took the view that "Daubert d[id] not create a special
analysis for answering questions about the admissibility of all expert testimony.
Instead, it provides a method for evaluating the reliability of witnesses who claim
scientific expertise." United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1996).
See also United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1158 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding
Daubert inapplicable to testimony based on experience or training); United States
v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1996); lacobelli Constr.,
Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1994).
130 82 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1996).
13' Id. at 1518-19.
132 Id. at 1519. According to the Compton court, when nonscientific expert
testimony is being offered "Rule 702 merely requires the trial court to make a
preliminary finding that proffered expert testimony is both relevant and reliable
while taking into account '[that t]he inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is . . . a
flexible one'." Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-95).
13 156 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 1998).
'34 122 F.3d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
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the Daubert standard for admissibility "is relevant only to testi-
mony bearing on 'scientific' knowledge" and may not be applied
to "technical" experts. 3 5 In the view of the Ninth Circuit, expert
testimony not based on scientific principles "should be assessed
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and its broad parameters of
reliability, relevancy and assistance to the trier of fact," without
application of the Daubert factors.
136
In contrast, in other courts, Daubert was interpreted to require
the trial judge to act as a gatekeeper against unreliable testimony
of all experts-scientific and nonscientific. 3 7 These courts
buttressed their interpretation of Daubert on the text of Rule
702.138 For example, in Berry v. City of Detroit, the Sixth Circuit
held that neither Daubert nor Rule 702 have provided for a
separate standard of admissibility for scientific and nonscientific
expert testimony. 139 The court stated that "[a]lthough, as indicat-
ed, Daubert dealt with scientific experts, its language relative to the
' Id. "This reading of Daubert is also supported by the Supreme Court's
explanation in Daubert, itself, that '[R]ule 702 also applies to technical, or other
specialized knowledge.' Our discussion is limited to the scientific context
because that is the nature of the expertise offered here." Id. (citing Daubert, 509
U.S. at 590 n.8.). See also United States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 711, 716 (9th Cir.
1997) (declaring that Daubert applies only to the admission of scientific
testimony); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1997); Thomas
v. Newton Int'l Entertainment, 42 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1994). But see
Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1143 n.8 (9th Cir.
1997) (providing that Daubert's holding applies to all expert testimony); Claar
v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29 F. 3d 499, 501 n.2. (9th Cir. 1994).
136 Desrosiers, 156 F.3d at 960. The Ninth Circuit, in McKendall, held that
expert testimony based on 30 years of experience is both "'facially helpful and
relevant' and seemingly reliable." 122 F.3d at 807. The opposition will have
every opportunity on cross-examination to point out flaws in that testimony. Id.
1' See Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding
that Daubert applies to all experts); Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., 97 F.3d 293,
297 (8th Cir. 1996); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1350 (6th Cir.
1993).
138 See FED. R. EvilD. 702 (providing "[i]f scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise").
139 25 F.3d at 1350.
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'gatekeeper' function is applicable to all expert testimony offered
under Rule 702."' 140 Furthermore, under Rule 702, the trial judge
must ensure the relevance and reliability of the testimony of
experts claiming "scientific," "technical," or other "specialized
knowledge."'' 41 The language of Rule 702 fails to create separate
standards of admissibility for expert testimony based on scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge. Therefore, according to
the Sixth Circuit, the gatekeeper role of the trial judge should not
be applied exclusively to scientific expert testimony.142
Courts that applied Daubert to all expert testimony also
emphasized that strong gatekeeping was equally important for
expert testimony based on nonscientific knowledge as for testimony
based on scientific knowledge. In Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., the
Fifth Circuit held that whether an expert would opine in an area of
scientific or nonscientific knowledge, "application of the Daubert
factors is germane to evaluating whether the expert is a hired gun
or a person whose opinion in the courtroom will withstand the
same scrutiny that it would among his professional peers." 143 The
court provided that:
It seems exactly backwards that experts who purport to
rely on [nonscientific knowledge] might escape screening
by the district court simply by stating that their conclusions
are not reached by any particular method or technique. The
moral of this approach would be, the less factual support
for an expert's opinion the better.144
Therefore, the trial judge's gatekeeping role is essential, whether
testimony is based on scientific or nonscientific expertise.1 45
In addition to the lack of uniform application by the courts as
to whether Daubert applied to the testimony of all experts, a
conflict among the circuits developed over the applicable standard
of appellate review of a trial court's decision to exclude expert
140 Id.
141 Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 702).
142 Id.
141 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997).




testimony under Daubert.46 The United States Supreme Court
has held that "abuse of discretion" is the proper standard of review
of a district court's evidentiary rulings. 147 However, some circuits
believed that "[b]ecause the Federal Rules of Evidence governing
expert testimony display a preference for admissibility, [appellate
courts should] apply a particularly stringent standard of review to
[a] trial judge's exclusion of testimony."'' 48
The Supreme Court addressed the question of the proper
standard of review to be applied when reviewing a trial court's
decision to exclude expert testimony in General Electric Co. v.
Joiner.149 In Joiner, the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's
holding that a heightened level of scrutiny is to be applied when
'46 Most courts took the view that Daubert did not alter the general rule that
abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review for a district court's
evidentiary ruling. See Dunfee v. Murray Ohio Mfg., 91 F.3d 1410, 1411 (10th
Cir. 1996) (holding that a trial judge's decision to exclude expert testimony under
Daubert should be reviewed "under the traditional abuse of discretion standard");
Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming a trial
court's decision to exclude expert testimony using the abuse of discretion
standard of review); Buckner v. Sam's Club, Inc., 75 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that a district court's rulings on evidentiary matters are reviewed
for abuse of discretion, "giving the trial judge much deference").
Some courts, however, took the view that "when the district court's
evidentiary rulings with respect to scientific opinion testimony will result in a
summary or directed judgment, [appellate courts] will give them a 'hard look'
(more stringent review) to determine if a district court has abused its discretion
in excluding evidence as unreliable." In re R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717,
749-50 (3d Cir. 1994). See also Joiner v. General Elec., 78 F.3d 524, 529 (1 lth
Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (holding that a higher standard
of review is required when reviewing a judge's exclusion of expert testimony).
147 See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 n.1 (1997) (providing
that "[t]he standard of review applicable to the evidentiary rulings of the district
court is abuse of discretion"); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54-55 (1984).
',4 Joiner, 78 F.3d at 529. See also In re R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d at
750 (holding that "where rules display a preference for a particular outcome,
[appellate] review of decisions under those rules is sometimes more searching").
'49 522 U.S. at 143. The Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Circuit erred
by applying a "particularly stringent standard of review" upon a trial judge's
exclusion of expert testimony. Id. An abuse of discretion standard of review is
to be used by an appellate court regardless of whether a trial judge has admitted
or excluded the testimony of an expert witness. Id. at 146-47.
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reviewing a trial judge's exclusion of expert testimony. 5° The
Supreme Court held that its decision in Daubert did not alter the
general rule regarding the appellate review standard for evidentiary
rulings."' Therefore, the Court held, a ruling regarding the
admissibility of expert testimony is reviewable under the abuse of
discretion standard and not a more stringent standard, irrespective
of whether the testimony was admitted or excluded. 152 Joiner was
viewed as "significant, providing trial courts with wide discretion
as they considered motions to exclude expert testimony, with
arguably less chance of reversal on appeal."1 53 With this contro-
versy settled, the more troubling question of whether the Court's
Daubert analysis was applicable to nonscientific expert testimony
remained unanswered.
II. KUMHO TIRE CO. V. CARMICHAEL' 54
In 1999, the United States Supreme Court, seeking to resolve
the conflict among the federal circuits as to whether Daubert was
limited only to scientific expertise, granted certiorari in Kumho
Tire v. Cannichael.155 Reversing the Eleventh Circuit, which held
that Daubert was limited to expert testimony based on scientific
knowledge, 156 the Court ruled that Daubert's standard of admissi-
bility applied to all experts. By virtue of this decision, the trial
judge is now the gatekeeper of all expert testimony to enter a
courtroom.
150 id.
15' The Supreme Court has held that "abuse of discretion is the proper
standard of review of a district court's evidentiary rulings." General Elec. Co.,
522 U.S. at 142-43 (citing Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 174 n.1; Abel, 469 U.S. at 54).
152 Id. at 143.
153 Jay R. McDaniel & Kevin J. O'Connor, U.S. Supreme Court Extends
'Relevance and Reliability' Inquiry to Nonscientific Expert Witness Testimony,
N.J.L.J., July 26, 1999, at 28.
154 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
155 Id. at 146.




A. The Lower Court's Interpretation of Daubert
In Kumho, a tire on a minivan driven by Patrick Carmichael
blew out, causing an accident that resulted in the death of one of
his passengers and serious injuries to the others.157 The
Carmichaels brought a products liability action in federal court
against the maker and distributors of the tire158 based upon
diversity jurisdiction.159 The plaintiffs claimed that the accident
resulted from tire failure, which was caused by a design or
manufacturing defect of the tire."6 The plaintiffs' case relied
significantly on the opinion of a tire failure expert, Dennis Carlson
Jr.161 He testified that, in his expert opinion, a defect in the tire's
manufacture or design caused the accident. 62 His opinion was
based on a theory that in the absence of at least two of four
specific physical symptoms that indicate tire abuse, the tire failure
of the sort that occurred to the Carmichaels was a result of a defect. 163
151 Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1516 (S.D. Ala.
1996).
'58 The tire maker and its distributors are referred to collectively as Kumho
Tire. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 142.
159 Carmichael, 923 F. Supp. at 1516.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1518. Carlson was a mechanical engineer, and was employed as a
tire consultant. Id. He earned a masters degree in mechanical engineering, and
worked as a consultant in the area of tire failure on a number of cases.
Additionally, he worked for Michelin America for 10 years in the field of tire
design. Id.
162 Id. at 1519.
163 Carlson's conclusion rested upon three propositions that were strongly
disputed by the defendants. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 144. First, if the separation of
the tire is not caused by overdeflection, which occurs when the tire is under-
inflated, overloaded, or both, then ordinarily its cause is a design or manufactur-
ing defect. Id. Second, a tire subject to overdeflection sufficient to cause a
separation will reveal physical symptoms, which include: "(a) tread wear on the
tire's shoulder which is greater than the tread wear along the tire's center, (b)
signs of a 'bead groove,' where the beads have been pushed too hard against the
bead seat on the inside of the tire's rim, (c) sidewalls of the tire with physical
signs of deterioration, such as discoloration, and/or (d) marks on the tire's rim
flange." Id. Third, where two of these four physical signs are not found, it may
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The defendant objected to Carlson's testimony on the grounds
that the methodology used to determine that the tire was defective
failed Rule 702's reliability requirement as required under
Daubert.'64 Although Carlson's testimony might have been
considered "technical" rather than "scientific," the district court
applied the Daubert standard and considered the four factors to
determine the admissibility of his testimony: (1) the testability of
Carlson's methodology; (2) whether his theory had been subjected
to peer review; (3) its potential rate of error; and (4) whether it has
gained acceptance throughout the tire industry.'65 The district
court held that "none of the four admissibility criteria outlined by
Daubert [were] satisfied," and, therefore, Carlson's testimony was
inadmissible.' 66
The court granted plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration,
67
which was premised upon their rigid application of the Daubert
factors.1 68 Upon reconsideration, the court agreed that the Dau-
bert factors were merely illustrative and that they should be applied
be concluded that a manufacturing or design defect caused the separation. Id.
Carlson failed to find two out of the four symptoms of overdeflection, which led
to his conclusion that a design or manufacturing defect in the tire caused the
blowout. Id.
164 Carmichael, 923 F. Supp. at 1518. The defendants also challenged
Carlson's qualifications to testify on the subject of tire failure. Id. The court held,
however, that it "need not rest its ruling on a determination of Carlson's
competence to offer an expert opinion on the causes of tire failure." Id. The
court did not examine his qualifications in any greater depth, and assumed that
Carlson was qualified to offer expert testimony on the subject of tire failure. Id.
at 1519.
165 Id. at 1520-22. The plaintiffs argued that "the Daubert Court was
concerned solely with the 'admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence." Id.
at 1521-22. Because Carlson's testimony is a mere "technical analysis," rather
than an opinion based on scientific evidence, Daubert is not applicable. Id. at
1521.
"6 Carmichael, 923 F. Supp. at 1522.
167 Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., No. 93-0860-CB-S, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22431, at *1 (S.D. Ala. June 6, 1996).
168 Id. at *4-6. The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration also contended that
the court erred "by applying a Daubert analysis to a mere 'technical inspection'
which is not scientific evidence;" but this argument was rejected by the court. Id.
at *2-3.
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flexibly by the trial judge.' 69 However, the court held that it "did
not convert the flexible Daubert inquiry into a rigid one; rather [it]
simply found the Daubert factors appropriate, analyzed them, and
discerned no competing criteria sufficiently strong to outweigh
them."' 7 The district court affirmed its earlier order, finding that
the expert's testimony lacked "sufficient indicia of reliability to be
admissible under Daubert and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence."
171
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the Daubert
standard was applicable to the testimony of the defendant's tire
failure expert.17 2 The court held that Daubert was limited only to
expert testimony relying on the application of scientific princi-
ples. 173 Further, the court determined that Carlson's testimony,
which relied on experience rather than science, fell outside
Daubert's scope. 174 The case was reversed and remanded for
"further (non-Daubert-type) consideration under Rule 702"' 175 and
the defendants filed an application for writ of certiorari.176
169 Id. at *5-6.
170 Id. at *6. The court found that "the Daubert factors did operate to gauge
the reliability of Carlson's method, and all of these factors indicated that his
testimony was properly excluded." Id.
171 Id. at *9-10.
172 Carmichael, 131 F.3d at 1433.
173 Id. at 1435.
" Id. at 1436. The court stated that "[alithough Samyang is no doubt correct
that the laws of physics and chemistry are implicated in the failure of Carmi-
chael's tire, Carlson makes no pretense of basing his opinion on any scientific
theory of physics or chemistry. Instead, Carlson rests his opinion on his
experience in analyzing failed tires." Id.
7 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 146 (1999) (citing
Carmichael, 131 F.3d at 1436). "Under Rule 702, it is the district court's duty
to determine if Carlson's testimony is sufficiently reliable and relevant to assist
a jury. Moreover, Carlson's testimony is subject to exclusion under Federal Rule
of Evidence 403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its likely
prejudicial effect." Carmichael, 131 F.3d at 1436.
176 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 146.
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B. The Supreme Court Interprets Daubert
In Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, Justice Stephen Breyer, writing
for the majority, held that the Daubert standard applies to the
testimony of engineers and other experts even though the testimony
is not based on the application of scientific principles.'77 Justice
Breyer emphasized that the trial judge's "gatekeeping" role applies
to the testimony of all experts. 178 Moreover, the Court held that
the factors used by the Daubert Court to assess the reliability of an
expert's testimony does not constitute a definitive list. 179 In
determining the reliability of a particular expert, the trial court
should consider the specific Daubert factors only where they are
reasonable measures of reliability.180 The Court further held that
the abuse of discretion standard shall apply to the trial judge's
decision regarding how to determine reliability as well as the final
decision to admit or exclude the testimony of an expert wit-
ness.' 81 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by excluding Carlson's testimony under the
Daubert analysis.
82
The Court's opinion commenced by holding that the gatekeep-
ing obligation of trial judges applies to the testimony of all
experts. 183 The Court stated that, "as a matter of language, [Rule
702] applies its reliability standard to all 'scientific,' 'technical,' or
'other specialized' matters within its scope."' ' 4 The Court
177 Id. at 147-49.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 150.
'80 Id. at 150-51.
181 Id. at 152-53.
182 Id. at 158.
183 Id. at 147. "In Daubert, the Court specified that it is the Rule's word
'knowledge,' not words (like 'scientific') that modify that word, 'that establishes
a standard of evidentiary reliability'." Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90).
Therefore, the language of Rule 702 makes "no relevant distinction between
'scientific' knowledge and 'technical' or 'other specialized' knowledge." Id.
"s Id. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
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conceded that Daubert only referred to "scientific" knowledge. 85
"But as the Court there said, it referred to 'scientific' testimony
'because that [wa]s the nature of the expertise' at issue."' 8 6 The
Court added that the evidentiary rationale that underlay Daubert's
gatekeeping standard is not limited to only "scientific" knowl-
edge."'87 The Federal Rules of Evidence grant testimonial latitude
to all experts, not only "scientific" experts, by allowing them to
testify to opinions.188 Therefore, it is necessary for trial judges to
assure that the opinion of every expert has "a reliable basis in the
knowledge and experience of his discipline."'' 89 Furthermore, the
Court provided that it would be extremely difficult for judges to
administer evidentiary rules under a standard that depended upon
a distinction between "scientific" knowledge and "technical" or
"other specialized" knowledge because there is no clear line that
divides the one from the others. 9 ° The Court also held that the
Daubert "factors do not constitute a definitive checklist or test" to
determine the reliability of an expert's testimony.' 9' The Court
recognized that the four factors used by the Daubert Court may not
be pertinent in assessing the reliability of the testimony of all
experts. 92 The Court stated that it "can neither rule out, nor rule
in, for all cases and for all time the applicability of the factors
mentioned in Daubert ... too much depends upon the particular
circumstances of the particular case at issue."'1 93 Rather, "a trial
court should only consider the specific factors identified in Daubert
where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
185 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147-48.
186 Id. at 148 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8).
187 Id.
188 id.
189 Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
'90 Id. at 148. "Disciplines such as engineering rest upon scientific
knowledge. Pure scientific theory itself may depend for its development upon
observation and properly engineered machinery. And conceptual efforts to
distinguish the two are unlikely to produce clear legal lines capable of
application in particular cases." Id.
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testimony."194 The Court concluded that "the trial judge must
have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go
about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.
That is to say, a trial court should consider the specific factors
identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the
reliability of expert testimony."' 95
Lastly, the court held that appellate courts should apply an
"abuse of discretion" standard to "trial court decisions about how
to determine reliability as to its ultimate conclusion."1 96 In
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the Court held that when reviewing
a trial judge's final decision to admit or exclude the testimony of
an expert, the appellate courts are to apply an abuse of discretion
standard. 197 Now, under Kumho, not only is a trial judge's final
decision regarding the admissibility of expert testimony subject to
an abuse of discretion review, but so is the decision on how to
properly assess its admissibility. 198 "Thus, whether Daubert's
specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of reliability
in a particular case is a matter that the law grants the trial judge
broad latitude to determine."' 99
The Court applied the foregoing standard to the district court's
decision to exclude Carlson's testimony.2°° The district court
properly assessed the reliability of the testimony by first looking at
the Daubert factors, none of which indicated that Carlson's
testimony was reliable.2 ° l Recognizing that the Daubert factors
were merely illustrative and may not apply in every case the trial
judge then considered whether Carlson's testimony satisfied "any
other set of reasonable reliability criteria. 20 2 The Supreme Court
viewed this as a proper assessment of the reliability of expert
194 Id. at 152.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146-47 (1997).
198 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 153.
20' Id. at 158.
2"2 Id. The trial court was unable find countervailing factors that would favor
admissibility, nor did the plaintiff argue that any such factors existed. Id. at 157.
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testimony, and ultimately held that the district court was within
their lawful discretion by excluding Carlson's testimony.20 3
Kumho expanded and clarified the standard used in determining
the admissibility of expert testimony that was developed in
Daubert. In both cases, the Supreme Court effectively interpreted
Rule 702, setting forth a standard that strikes a sound balance by
adhering to the drafter's of the Federal Rules of Evidence endorse-
ment of the use of expert testimony in litigation, while at the same
time granting district court judges wide discretionary authority to
exclude unreliable expert testimony.' The Court's interpretation
of Rule 702 achieved the aim of its drafters by permitting reliable
expert testimony of a broad range of experts, encompassing far
more than merely those individuals claiming expert knowledge in
an area of science. 2 5 In addition, by abandoning "general accep-
tance" as the sole criterion for determining admissibility of expert
testimony, Rule 702 permits expert testimony based on emerging
areas of science and technology.2°
The Court's interpretation of Rule 702 provides a safeguard that
assures the reliability of all expert testimony.2 7 It assigns trial
203 Id. at 158.
204 "An intelligent evaluation of the facts is often difficult or impossible
without the application of some scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge. The most common source of this knowledge is the expert witness."
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
205 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note. See also infra Part
ILI.A. 1 (discussing how the Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 702 follows
the drafter's endorsement of the use of expert testimony).
206 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. However, "general acceptance" can still affect
admissibility. Id. at 594. "A 'reliability assessment does not require, although it
does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an
express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that communi-
ty'." Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir.
1985)).
207 Id. at 589. The court stated:
That the Frye test was displaced by the Federal Rules of Evidence
does not mean, however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on
the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the trial
judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the contrary, under
the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.
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judges the role of "gatekeeper," which requires that they "make
certain that an expert, whether basing testimony on professional
studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same
level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practices of an
expert in the relevant field."2 8 By assuring the reliability of the
expert testimony, district court judges may prevent professional
expert witnesses from determining the outcome of a case by
offering unfounded testimony.2" As a result, this interpretation
of Rule 702 is not only in line with the intent of the drafters of the
Rule, but is curative as well.
III. ENSURING PROPER ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AFTER
KUMHO
Expert testimony plays a critical role in litigation by assisting
jurors in understanding complex facts necessary for them to make
intelligent determinations.10 Therefore, it is imperative that the
use of expert testimony in the courtroom be permitted and
encouraged. The use of expert testimony, however, also creates
problems. Expert testimony is highly influential, impacting the
outcome of many cases.2" The influence of expert testimony on
jurors, when coupled with the fact that many experts are "hired
guns," offering biased opinions to the highest bidder, poses a
serious threat to the proper administration of justice.212 Therefore,
it is crucial that all expert testimony that is heard by the jury be
reliable. Rule 702, as interpreted in Kumho, both encourages the
Id.
20 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 1176.
209 See infra Part IH.A.2 (discussing the danger of professional witnesses
offering unfounded testimony and how the gatekeeper role of the trial judge
protects against that danger).
210 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note. "An intelligent evaluation
of the facts is often difficult or impossible without the application of some
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. The most common source
of this knowledge is the expert witness." Id.
2' See supra notes 46-49 (providing data evidencing the effect of expert
testimony on jury trials).




use of expert testimony and provides a means by which trial judges
can ensure that it is reliable, thereby, permitting reliable expert
testimony to assist the trier of fact, but deterring the unfounded
testimony of a "hired gun" from dictating the outcome of a case.
A. The Importance of Judicial Discretion in Admitting
Expert Testimony
Under Kumho, trial court judges, acting as "gatekeepers," are
given wide discretion to determine the reliability of the testimony
of all experts, including those whose expertise falls outside the
realm of science.213 Kumho granted district courts leeway in
deciding how they choose to evaluate the reliability of experts,
permitting trial judges to decide what factors are an accurate
measure of an expert's reliability on an ad hoc basis.214 One
practitioner has stated that "Kumho clearly and unequivocally
reiterates the broad discretion of trial courts to act as evidentiary
gatekeepers. ' '215
The discretionary power granted under Kumho is necessary to
enable the effective assessment of the reliability of expert testimo-
ny.216 A specific set of factors, as those used in Daubert, may not
always be pertinent to a district court's reliability assessment.2 7
Much depends on "the nature of the issue, the expert's particular
expertise, and the subject of [an expert's] testimony. ,218 There-
fore, in order to adequately determine whether expert testimony is
23 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 149-53.
214 id.
215 William H. Latham, "Gatekeepers' Discretion:" Flexible Standards on
Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Wake of Kumho, 11 S.C. LAW. 15, 19,
July/August, 1999. See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
589 (establishing the "gatekeeping" function).
216 See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152 (providing that "[tihe trial court must have
the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert's reliability... as it
enjoys when it decides whether or not that expert's relevant testimony is
reliable").
217 Id. In Daubert, the Court looked to the testability of the experts
methodology, whether it has been subject to peer review, its potential rate of
error, and its general acceptance. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95.
218 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150.
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reliable, a trial court judge must have discretion in choosing what
factors will be an accurate measure of reliability for the testimony
of a particular expert.219 In granting wide judicial discretion the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 702's standard strikes a
sound balance. Acknowledging the importance of expert testimony
in litigation, Rule 702 permits, and encourages, the admission of
testimony from a wide range of nonscientific and scientific
experts.22° In addition, its reliability requirement allows trial court
judges to exclude unfounded, or "junky," expert testimony.22'
1. Admitting Expert Testimony to Assist the Juror
The use of expert testimony was endorsed by the Federal Rules
of Evidence upon its enactment.222 The drafters recognized the
important role that experts play in litigation. By explaining
complex subjects in a manner that makes them understandable to
the average person, experts provide jurors with the knowledge that
is necessary for them to make well reasoned determinations.223 In
the drafter's view an "intelligent evaluation of the facts is often
difficult or impossible" without the assistance of an expert
witness.2  This endorsement of the use of expert witnesses by
the drafter's has led to the view that Rule 702 takes a liberal
approach toward the admissibility expert testimony.225 Further-
more, the Rules' liberal approach is made apparent in the drafter's
219 Id.
220 See infra Part I.A. 1 (discussing the importance of expert testimony and
the district court's ability to admit a wide variety of experts under Kumho).
221 See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing the trial court judge's ability to exclude
unfounded expert testimony under the Court's interpretation of Rule 702).
222 FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note.
223 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (describing the role of
an expert witness as someone who will "assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue"). See also Garcia, supra note 42, at 46
(providing that "the high degree of informational and technological specialization
in our society makes the use of expert witnesses imperative").
224 FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note.
225 See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 19, § 6262, at 184 (discussing the




expansion of the meaning of the term "expert," which under Rule
702 includes far more than those individuals claiming specialized
knowledge in an area of science.226
The "liberal thrust" of Rule 702, and the Federal Rules of
Evidence in general, was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in
its creation of the current standard of admissibility of expert
testimony.227 The discretionary power granted trial judges, under
the Courts interpretation of Rule 702, allows for the admission of
testimony from a variety of experts claiming expertise in wide
array of subject matter. Under the Kumho standard, trial court
judges acting as "gatekeepers," have admitted expert testimony
from individuals possessing "specialized knowledge" in areas such
as "the methods and operations of street level drug dealers," 228
and "gang affiliations. ' '229
District Courts are mindful of the importance of the use of
expert testimony in making complex issues understandable to jurors
and seek to admit expert testimony that will assist jurors in their
understanding of the facts in dispute.23 ° In Battenfeld of America
Holding Co., v. Baird, Kurtz & Dobson, the trial court judge
granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff because
of the defendant's failure to offer expert testimony.231' The case
involved a negligence action brought by the plaintiff against an
accounting firm that allegedly performed negligent accounting and
auditing services for a corporation purchased by the plaintiff.
232
226 See FED. R. EviD. 702 (stating that "[tihe fields of knowledge which may
be drawn upon are not limited merely to the 'scientific' and 'technical' but
extend to all 'specialized' knowledge"). See also supra notes 51-54 and
accompanying text, discussing the meaning of "specialized knowledge" under
Rule 702.
227 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (stating that the rigid standard under Frye
was "at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules [of Evidence]") (citing
Beech Aircraft Corp., v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
228 United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 580, 588-89 (6th Cir. 1999).
229 United States v. Matthews, 178 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir. 1999).
230 See Harris, 192 F.2d at 589 (admitting expert testimony regarding drug
dealing because "it will aid the jury's understanding of an area ... not within
the experience of the average juror").
231 60 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Kan. 1999).
232 Id. at 1192.
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The defendant accounting firm attempted to compare its own
alleged negligence with the plaintiffs' negligence in performing its
pre-corporate acquisition due diligence.233  The defendant's
comparative fault designation was denied, however, because of its
failure "to come forward with any expert testimony with respect to
the standard of care for due diligence in connection with a
corporate acquisition. ' '2' A jury of lay people possesses no
common knowledge about complex business practice, therefore, it
"is not in a position to determine how much diligence is due
without the assistance of someone who has that specialized
knowledge-an expert witness. 235
Similarly, in Cooper v. Toshiba Home Technology Corp., a
district court recognized the importance of expert testimony in its
decision to admit the testimony of an expert in a products liability
23action. 36 The court stated that "[w]hen the product in question
is of a complex nature such that a lay juror could not, in the
absence of expert testimony, infer that a defective condition of the
product caused the product's failure and caused the resulting injury
to the plaintiff, expert testimony is a necessary component of a
plaintiff 's case. 237 It is essential that trial judges, acting as
gatekeepers, are cognizant of the important role that expert
testimony plays in the judicial process. However, it is also
imperative that trial judges be aware of the dangers posed by the
use expert testimony.
2. Preventing the Prejudicial Effect of Unfounded Expert
Testimony
A liberal approach towards the admissibility of expert testimo-
ny, as sought by Rule 702, is necessary in promoting the jury's
search for the truth by helping jurors to understand the facts in
233 Id. at 1210.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 1211.
236 76 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
237 Id. at 1276.
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dispute. 38 Too liberal an approach, however, can undermine the
role of the jury. It is feared that an overly-liberal standard "will
result in a 'free-for-all' in which befuddled juries are confounded
by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions. '239 The
complex subject matter of expert testimony is beyond the lay
person's understanding, making it nearly impossible for a jury to
properly assess. Therefore, when faced with expert testimony,
jurors may defer to the guidance of that expert.2' This deference
can impinge on the proper administration of justice, considering
that experts are often not testifying as impartial witnesses, but as
advocates working for those who are willing to pay their fees. 41
Therefore, it is imperative that trial judges ensure that the influen-
tial testimony of an expert is reliable.
Attorneys seek to hire experts who will support their position
and will appeal to jurors, regardless of whether the testimony given
is incomplete and inaccurate.242 This has resulted in the unfavor-
able view that expert witnesses are "hired guns" offering unfound-
ed testimony, for a fee, with the sole purpose of influencing the
238 See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 19, § 6262, at 178 (discussing the
policy goals of Rule 702).
239 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. at 595 (discussing the
fears of those who argued that abandoning the Frye standard created too liberal
of a standard).
240 Id. See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 19, § 6262, at 182 (providing that
jurors cannot critically evaluate the basis of an expert's testimony, resulting in
the undermining of the jury's role of trier of fact). See also notes 62-68 and
accompanying text (discussing the impact of expert testimony on jurors).
24 See The Use and Misuse of Expert Evidence in the Courts, supra note 47,
at 69 (providing that "[tihe hiring and preparation of experts by opposing
attorneys has led to charges that an expert really is a 'hired gun," telling only
that portion of the truth that helps the side of the attorney who is paying the
witness"). See also Don J. DeBenedictis, Off Target Opinions, with Expert
Witnesses Being Paid to Testify on Everything from Alloys to Zygotes, Courts
Are Increasingly Willing to Let Clients Sue their Hired Guns who Misfire on the
Stand, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994, at 76 (stating that "[t]he explosion of experts and
expertise has stirred concern among bench and bar about professional
witnesses-called hired guns or worse-who might testify to anything for a price").
242 BERT BLACK & PATRICK W. LEE, EXPERT EVIDENCE, A PRACTmIoNER's
GUIDE TO LAW, SCIENCE, AND THE FJC MANUAL 33-4 (1997).
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outcome of a case. 3 Judge Learned Hand referred to experts as
"the hired champion[s] of one side" acknowledging the bias of
experts who are liberally paid to defend the position of a single
party.' 4 Others have described expert witnesses more unfavor-
ably, as:
mercenaries, prostitutes, or hired guns, witnesses devoid of
principle who sell their opinions to the highest bidder.
Experts are not impartial professionals who explain
difficult concepts to the trier of fact. Rather, experts
become advocates for the side who hired them ...
[e]xperts testify to matters beyond their expertise, render
opinions that are unreliable, speculative or outside what the
experts would be willing to say in their own disciplines,
and misrepresent the certainty of many.., principles they
rely on and conclusions they reach. 24
Many noted members of the federal judiciary have recognized
this problem. Judge Jack B. Weinstein has written that "[a]n expert
can be found to testify to the truth of almost any factual theory, no
matter how frivolous. . . . The most tenuous factual bases are
sufficient to produce firm opinions to a high degree of 'medical (or
other expert) probability' or even 'certainty'." 246 In In re Air
Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La., Judge Patrick E. Higgin-
botham warned trial judges to be wary of professional expert
witnesses, who spend all their time consulting with attorneys and
testifying. 247 He declared that "experts whose opinions are avail-
able to the highest bidder have no place testifying in a court of
law, before a jury, and with the imprimatur of the trial judge's
decision that he is an 'expert'. '24s Judge Higginbotham sent a
23 L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back to the Future, 29 U.
RICH. L. REv. 1389, 1389 (1995).
244 See Hand, supra note 65, at 53.
245 Perrin, supra note 243, at 1389.
246 Weinstein, supra note 44, at 482.
247 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986).
248 Id. Judge Higginbotham warned trial judges to be apprehensive of
scholars "who present studies and express opinions that they might not be willing
express in an article submitted to a refereed journal of their discipline or in other
contexts subject to peer review." Id.
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clear message to trial judges, "it is time to take hold of expert
testimony in federal trials., 249 Rule 702, under Kumho, allows
trial judges to do just that: "[T]ake hold of expert testimony in
federal trials." 250
The Kumho standard is an effective solution to the problems
caused by the proliferation of "hired guns" testifying in modem
litigation. By allowing trial judges to screen expert testimony, they
will prevent unwitting jurors from being subject to the influence of
experts who offer unfounded testimony. More importantly, by
ensuring the reliability of expert testimony, trial judges can thwart
an attorney's attempt to affect the outcome of a case with the use
of a "hired gun."
The trial judge acting as gatekeeper can ensure reliability of
expert testimony more so than relying on jurors to detect flaws in
the methodology of experts.2 1 "A judge's skill and knowledge
should enable him or her to comprehend complex evidence more
easily than jurors who may lack extensive formal education. ' '252
In addition, over the course of time most judges can develop an
understanding of various complex subjects far beyond the level of
understanding of a juror.253 Moreover, unlike jurors, a trial judge
would not be limited to listening to the oral testimony of the expert
in the courtroom. 254 Judges can review documents and briefs, and
may consult other sources, including advisors, in order to gain a
better understanding of the experts subject matter.255
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 See Garcia, supra note 42, at 46 (providing that a judge is better
equipped than jurors to assess expert testimony); Suzanne E. Riley, The End of
an Era: Junk Science Departs Products Liability, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 502, 507
(1996). See also Weinstein, supra note 44, at 482 (stating that "it may be the
task of the judge to do what the adversarial process and professional ethics have
failed to do").
252 Garcia, supra note 42, at 47.
253 Riley, supra note 251, at 507.
254 BLACK & LEE, supra note 242, at 33.
255 id.
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In addition to being an effective screening method the Kumho
standard forces attorneys to act more responsibly."6 Attorneys
are now more careful in selecting their experts.257 An impressive
resume, good looks, and an effective courtroom presence are no
longer enough.258 When seeking an expert, attorneys now must
look for those who are able to offer testimony based on methodol-
ogies that will be deemed to be reliable by a trial court judge.259
"The bottom line for the litigator is to challenge the expert to
withstand Rule 702 scrutiny before the court does."2'
B. Alternatives to a Kumho System Are Inadequate
A number of alternative solutions have been suggested to
address the problem of erroneous expert testimony influencing
juries. It is argued that the traditional adversarial system is a
sufficient means of enabling jurors to identify a "hired gun" who
is offering phony expertise. 211 "Vigorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of
attacking shaky but admissible evidence."
262
The nature of the adversary system alone, however, is an
ineffective means of mitigating the dangers of expert testimony.
256 See James A. Young, 'Daubert' Has Made Lawyers Act Professionally,
NAT'L L. J., Jan. 11, 1999, at A29 (explaining that after Daubert attorneys must
take steps to ensure that their experts are not "hired guns" offering unreliable
testimony).
257 See R. Christopher Rosenthal & Maria J. Staggers, A Kumho Checklist,
LEGAL TIMES, June 7, 1999 at S40 (discussing methods used by attorneys to
ensure that an expert's testimony will survive a challenge, and be found reliable
by the court).
25 Jerold S. Solovy & Joel J. Africk, Use of Experts in Federal Courts in
the Wake of Kumho Tire, PRAc. LITIGATOR, January 2000 at 23.
259 See Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Is Your Expert's Testimony
Admissible Under the Supreme Court's Recent Ruling in Kumho Tire Co.?, 18
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 21(discussing ways in which attorneys can ensure that
their expert's testimony be found reliable).
260 Id.
261 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1997).
262 Id. at 596.
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Cross examination does not provide adequate protection against
unfounded expert testimony influencing the outcome of the
jury.2 63 Trial lawyers are unable to adequately cross examine
experts because they lack the expertise that is necessary to expose
the flaws of an expert's analysis.26 Furthermore, jurors them-
selves would be unable to detect flaws in an expert's methodology
if they were to be revealed on cross examination. 265 Moreover,
the use of rebuttal evidence in the form of contradictory expert
testimony will not assist jurors in their assessment; rather, the
testimony of opposing witnesses confuses jurors.266 "Thus, there
is a need for courts to exercise a gatekeeping function in connec-
tion with expert testimony where that testimony deals with complex
matters that strain the jury's ability to effectively perform its
traditional functions. 267
Another alternative to allowing biased testimony of expert
witnesses is the use of court appointed neutral experts.268 Federal
Rule of Evidence 706 gives trial judges the authority to deviate
from the conventional adversarial system and to select an expert
witness to testify.269 Proponents of court appointed experts argue
that they have the ability to offer truly unbiased testimony because
they are not tainted by partisan selection.27° In addition, the
drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence believed that merely
enacting Rule 706 would have a chilling effect on the problem of
263 Garcia, supra note 42, at 58.
264 Garcia, supra note 42, at 58.
265 Garcia, supra note 42, at 58.
266 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 19, § 6262, at 187; Strier, Road to Reform,
supra note 72, at 1271.
267 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 19, § 6262, at 187.
268 See The Use and Misuse of Expert Evidence in the Courts, supra note 47,
at 69 (discussing the use of court appointed experts).
269 Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism
Meets Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L. REv. 59, 75 (1998). See also FED. R.
EVID. 706 (pertaining to the use of court appointed experts); WRIGHT & GOLD,
supra note 19, § 6302 at 452 (providing that the use of court appointed experts
is a departure "from the usual operation of the adversary system under which the
opportunity to adduce evidence is put into the hands of counsel").
270 The Use and Misuse of Expert Evidence in the Courts, supra note 47, at
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expert witnesses offering unfounded testimony.27' The drafters
provided that:
While experience indicates that actual appointment is a
relatively infrequent occurrence, the assumption may be
made that the availability of the procedure in itself
decreases the need for resorting to it. The ever-present
possibility that the judge may appoint an expert in a given
case must inevitably exert a sobering effect on the expert
witness of a party and upon the person utilizing his
272services.
The judiciary's unwillingness to appoint experts, however, appears
to have prevented Rule 706 from having the chilling effect on
unfounded expert testimony that was desired.
Court appointed experts are rarely used by trial judges for
several reasons. The appointment of expert witnesses compromises
the impartiality of a judge, who has no financial ties to either party,
because the expert "still enters the courtroom with all the vested
professional interests and biases developed over the course or a
career." 27 3 Furthermore, court appointed experts undermine the
adversarial system by limiting the parties' autonomy over the
development of the evidence.274 Most importantly, court appoint-
ed experts have too much power, destroying the parties' right to a
jury decision because the expert becomes "a de facto fact-
finder. '275 "[T]he opinion of a court's expert would be decisive
271 FED. R. EvID. 706 advisory committee's note.
272 id.
273 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 19, § 6302 at 456.
274 See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 19, § 6302 at 452 (providing that the
use of court appointed experts is a departure "from the usual operation of the
adversary system under which the opportunity to adduce evidence is put into the
hands of counsel").
27 See Gross, supra note 16, at 1190-91 (discussing why many judges do
not use court-appointed experts). Opponents of Rule 706 complain "that the
opinion of the court's expert would be decisive in any case because such an
expert acquires from the court the mantle of both authority and impartiality."
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 19, § 6301 at 441. "[T]his great influence wielded
by court expert's undermines both the adversary process and the jury system ....
[and] the aura of impartiality is misleading because no expert is unbiased." Id.
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in any case in which it is offered because such an expert acquires
from the court the mantle of both authority and impartiality.
2 76
Some other suggested solutions include the elimination of the
prejudicial effect of the use of the word "expert," 27 7 and the
development of an expert witness tracking system.278 However,
neither would prove to be effective. Eliminating the use of the term
"expert" would not reduce the deference given to expert witnesses
by jurors. Simply by referring to expert testimony as opinion
testimony will not lessen the impact of that testimony. Upon
revealing their qualifications before the jury, "opinion" witnesses
will achieve the status of expert in the eyes of the jury. Jurors will
be aware that the "opinion" witness is an individual with expert
knowledge in the area in which that witness testifies regardless of
whether that witness is labeled an expert.
The use of an expert witness tracking system is also not an
adequate solution to the problem of unreliable expert testimony. It
is claimed that by tracking expert witnesses and the testimony they
give, a tracking system will enable attorneys to seek out conflicting
opinions of that witness and expose them upon cross examina-
tion.279 However, with the great number of professional expert
witnesses today, it would never be difficult to find an expert who
has testified consistently to a single conclusion. 280 "Experience
shows that it has become increasingly common for expert witnesses
to be 'plaintiff' or 'defendant' oriented., 28'
The standard set forth in Kumho provides an effective method
of preventing unreliable testimony from dictating the outcome of
a case. Trial judges are well suited to assess the reliability of expert
testimony and, acting as gatekeepers, they can adequately exclude
276 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 19, § 6301, at 441.
277 Richey, supra note 1, at 544-45 (claiming that by eliminating the term
"expert" jurors will give less deference to expert witnesses).
278 Expert Witness Tracking System, 8 No. 2 ExPERT WITNEss J. 1 (1996).
279 id.
80 Experts have been found to offer "cookie cutter" opinions, which are
nearly identical expert opinions for many separate actions. Wooley v. Smith &
Nephew Richards, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 703, 707 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
281 See James A. Young, 'Daubert' Has Made Lawyers Act Professionally,
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 11, 1999, at 30 (discussing how attorneys now aim to find
experts who will survive a reliability challenge).
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"junky" expert testimony. 2 2 In addition, Kumho has forced
attorneys to be more selective and act more responsibly when
seeking expert testimony.
2s3
C. Black v. Food Lion, Inc. :284 An Early Application of
Kumho
The Kumho standard was applied by the Fifth Circuit in Black
v. Food Lion, Inc. only seven days after the Supreme Court issued
its, opinion in Kumho. "Black demonstrates that Daubert-Kumho
principles can be a barrier to even a reputable expert's testimony,
if that expert's testimony fails to meet a court's standard for
intellectual rigor." 5 In Black, the appellate Court reviewed a
magistrate judge's decision 216 to admit expert testimony, stating
that a slip-and-fall injury at a grocery store caused the plaintiff to
suffer fibromyalgia syndrome, a debilitating affliction characterized
by generalized pain, poor sleep, lack of concentration and chronic
fatigue. 287 The magistrate made a determination that the expert's
testimony was reliable, and therefore admissible, without applying
any of the specific factors used in Daubert.2 s
In discussing the magistrate judge's decision not to apply the
specific Daubert factors to determine the reliability of this expert's
testimony, the Fifth Circuit focused on Kumho's holding that trial
court judges "may" consider several more factors that were not
specifically mentioned in Daubert.289 The Fifth Circuit stated that
282 See supra notes 251-255 and accompanying text (discussing the ability
of district judges to assess the reliability of expert testimony).
" See supra notes 256-260 and accompanying text (discussing how Kumho
has forced attorneys to seek expert's who can offer reliable testimony).
284 171 F.3d. 308 (5th Cir. 1999).
285 David Rubenstein, Case Casts Cold Eye on Non-Scientific Expert, First
Post-Kumho Ruling Says Narrow is the Gate, CORP. LEGAL TIMES July 1999, at
30 (discussing first application of Kumho).
286 Black, 171 F.3d at 309. The case was tried before a magistrate judge
without a jury. Id.
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 311. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150 (providing that trial court judges
may use additional factors to assess the reliability of expert testimony where the
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"Kumho Tire's emphasis on the word 'may' should not be mis-
understood to grant open season on the admission of expert
testimony by permitting courts discretionarily to disavow the
Daubert factors., 290 The court went on to state:
Kumho Tire does not require district courts to reinvent the
wheel every time expert testimony is offered in court. Just
as the Supreme Court relied on the Daubert factors in
Kumho Tire, those factors may be used as a starting point
for analysis in the usual case. In a vast majority of cases,
the factors mentioned in Daubert are appropriate. Once it
considers the Daubert factors, the court then can consider
whether other factors, not mentioned in Daubert, are
relevant to the case at hand.291
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held, the magistrate judge abused his
discretion by not applying the Daubert factors in assessing the
reliability of the expert's testimony.292
The Black case provides a hint as to which direction the federal
courts are heading regarding the determination of the admissibility
of expert testimony. The trial court judge acting as gatekeeper must
use his discretion in assessing the reliability of expert testimony.
However, "it is not discretion to perform the function inadequately.
Rather, it is discretion to choose among reasonable means of
excluding expertise that is fausse and science that is junky., 293
CONCLUSION
Expert testimony is a valuable tool used in litigation to assist
jurors in making intelligent assessments of the facts at issue. Due
to the complexity of their testimony and status as "experts,"
however, they can often usurp the fact finding role of the jury.
Therefore, a standard is necessary by which a trial court judge can
assess expert testimony and exclude testimony which is found to
be unreliable.
factors specifically mentioned in Daubert are not pertinent).
290 Black, 171 F. 3d. at 311.
291 Id. at 312.
292 Id. at 314.
293 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 159 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court held that
the trial judge's gatekeeping role, as established in Daubert, applies
to the testimony of all experts. Moreover, the Court held that the
Daubert four factor test does not constitute a definitive checklist or
rigid test. Rather, a district court judge need only consider the
specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable
measures of the reliability of expert testimony. As a result, the
district court judge was granted great discretion in determining the
reliability and, thus, admissibility of an expert's testimony.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as interpreted by the Supreme
Court permits and encourages the use of expert testimony from a
wide range of fields of expertise. In addition, Rule 702 has been
interpreted to permit the use of expert testimony based on new and
emerging sciences and techniques. Therefore, it is achieving the
aim of its drafters, as well. A safeguard has been interpreted into
the rule. This safeguard assigns the role of "gatekeeper" to trial
court judges, which gives a court wide discretionary power to
ensure that the testimony of both scientific and nonscientific
experts is reliable. The current standard for determining the
admissibility of expert testimony, following Kumho, is an effective
screening method that ensures that an expert's testimony is reliable.
With the absence of viable alternatives to the use of expert
testimony by each litigant, Kumho establishes the best standard to
assure that a professional expert witness, who possesses a gift for
persuading unknowing jurors, will not have the opportunity to
present unfounded expert testimony that will effect the outcome of
a case.
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